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ABSTRACT
Is federal diversity jurisdiction case specific or claim specific? The
complete-diversity rule makes clear that, when a diversity defect is
noted in a putative diversity action, the court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over that action as a whole. But does the court’s
jurisdiction nevertheless extend to claims between diverse parties, such
that the case continues if the nondiverse spoiler is dismissed?
We engage this persistent and unsettled question by identifying and
exploring two possible answers, each based on a distinct theory of
subject-matter jurisdiction that boasts doctrinal support. The first we
denote “joint jurisdiction”—an all-or-nothing theory—under which a
diversity defect contaminates the whole case and deprives the court of
jurisdiction over claims between diverse parties too. The second we
denote “several jurisdiction”—a claim-by-claim theory—under which
the court lacks jurisdiction over claims between nondiverse parties but
always had, and continues to have, jurisdiction over claims between
diverse parties.
We then offer a way to reconcile these seemingly incompatible
theories and precedent: shifting the time of jurisdictional assessment
from the time of filing in federal court to the time of dismissal of the
jurisdictional spoiler. We also discuss how that solution potentially
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creates new tensions, particularly regarding the notion that a court
without subject-matter jurisdiction over an action may nonetheless
render a binding adjudication of claims within that action. Finally, we
explain how the application of other jurisdictional authorizations—
including the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine and the
jurisdictional-resequencing doctrine—might alleviate tensions created
by our time-shifting proposal.
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INTRODUCTION
Diversity jurisdiction is an odd duck. It empowers federal courts
to adjudicate certain state-law claims based on a risk, or the
1
appearance of a risk, of state bias against out-of-state litigants. That
rationale is perplexing in a federalist system today that presumes the
2
competence of state courts to adjudicate issues without such bias and

1. See Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) (explaining that the
traditional rationale of diversity jurisdiction is to reduce “the possible fears and apprehensions”
of out-of-state litigants that the state court will be biased against them). But see Henry J.
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 495–99 (1928)
(arguing that the real reason was to advance corporate interests opposed by antibusiness state
legislatures and judges).
2. See Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59–60 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). In Elbert, Justice Frankfurter asked,
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that requires federal courts to apply the same substantive law as state
3
courts would. In addition, the state-bias rationale has morphed
inconsistently over time, from an early probusiness rationale to
protecting distant plaintiffs from the political power of local
corporations to today protecting large corporations from being forced
to defend against multistate class actions in certain plaintiff-friendly
4
state courts. Further, diversity jurisdiction can be invoked even when
the bias rationale is turned on its head, such as when an in-state
5
plaintiff invokes diversity jurisdiction. Yet through these changes,
and despite calls for limiting or even eliminating diversity
6
jurisdiction, the doctrine has been a mainstay of federal dockets for
more than two hundred years.
In the ongoing policy debate about the scope and propriety of
diversity jurisdiction, basic technical oddities of diversity jurisdiction
have gone overlooked. Diversity jurisdiction, unlike its younger

Can it fairly be said that state tribunals are not now established on a sufficiently ‘good
footing’ to adjudicate state litigation that arises between citizens of different States,
including the artificial corporate citizens, when they are the only resort for the much
larger volume of the same type of litigation between their own citizens? Can the state
tribunals not yet be trusted to mete out justice to nonresident litigants; should
resident litigants not be compelled to trust their own state tribunals?
Id.; see also Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 87 (assuming “that the tribunals of the states will
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation”); Friendly, supra note 1, at 493 (arguing
that there is no evidence of state-court bias); see generally Scott Dodson, The Gravitational
Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703 (2016) (demonstrating that state courts tend to
decide issues of state law by mimicking federal-court interpretations of analogous federal law).
3. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
4. Compare Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 329 (1853) (“The
right of choosing an impartial tribunal is a privilege of no small practical importance, and more
especially in cases where a distant plaintiff has to contend with the power and influence . . .
wielded by corporations in almost any state.”), with Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L.
109-2, § 2(a)(4)(B), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005) (“Abuses in class actions undermine the national
judicial system . . . in that State and local courts are . . . sometimes acting in ways that
demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants . . . .”). See also Friendly, supra note 1, at 496–
97 (“[W]e may say that the desire to protect creditors against legislation favorable to debtors
was a principal reason for the grant of diversity jurisdiction.”). Some have suggested that the
most persuasive rationale is not about bias at all, but rather is about preserving attorney choice
of forum. See Charles Alan Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law
Institute Proposals, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 207 (1969).
5. See, e.g., Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 348 U.S. at 54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
6. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 139–47
(1985); Rodney K. Miller, Article III and Removal Jurisdiction: The Demise of the Complete
Diversity Rule and a Proposed Return to Minimal Diversity, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 269, 312–13
(2012); Thomas D. Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential
for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963, 966 (1979).
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sibling federal-question jurisdiction, is grounded in the character of
the parties rather than the character of the claim. This feature makes
diversity jurisdiction both more complicated than federal-question
jurisdiction and more susceptible to party gamesmanship. Compliance
with the diversity requirements can be difficult to determine. That
difficulty is particularly problematic in the context of subject-matter
jurisdiction—if a federal court lacks jurisdiction, it has no power to
8
proceed, even if the case had been litigated productively for years.
The difficulty of assessing compliance with the strictures of
diversity jurisdiction is exacerbated by the longstanding “complete
diversity” interpretation of the general diversity-jurisdiction statute:
9
all plaintiffs must be diverse in citizenship from all defendants. The
purported rationale of the complete-diversity rule is that the presence
of same-state opponents neutralizes any state bias and thus obviates
10
the need for federal jurisdiction.
One nettlesome but unsettled complication of the requirement of
complete diversity is simply illustrated. Consider a suit in federal
court in which a single plaintiff from Texas asserts state-law claims

7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending the “judicial Power” to “all cases, in law and equity,
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their authority”); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.”).
8. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884). For
arguments limiting this impact, see Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
1439, 1442 (2011); Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23–25 (2008).
9. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (“The court understands
these expressions to mean, that each distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of
whom are entitled to sue . . . in the federal courts.”); 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 3605 (3d ed. 2014) (stating that “the Strawbridge rule has been followed for more than two
centuries”). The complete-diversity rule applies only to § 1332, not to Article III’s grant of
diversity jurisdiction or to other statutory grants of diversity jurisdiction. See State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967) (holding Article III to authorize the exercise of
diversity jurisdiction as long as there exists “minimal diversity,” meaning that at least one
plaintiff in the action is diverse in citizenship from at least one defendant); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1335
(2012) (authorizing minimal diversity jurisdiction for statutory interpleader); id. § 1332(d)
(authorizing minimal diversity jurisdiction for certain class actions).
10. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3605 (“The presumed theory behind the original
grant of diversity jurisdiction . . . was to provide a neutral, national forum for cases in which
there would be a danger of bias in a state court . . . . This justification . . . does not apply to cases
in which there are citizens from the same state on opposing sides . . . .”); David Currie, The
Federal Courts and the American Law Institute Part I, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 18 (1968); see also
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 564 (2005) (“A failure of complete
diversity . . . contaminates every claim in the action.”).
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against two defendants—one from California and the other from
Texas—and alleges claims for $500,000 against each defendant. It is
beyond dispute that the federal court lacks diversity jurisdiction over
the plaintiff’s claim against the nondiverse Texas defendant, and thus
lacks diversity jurisdiction over the action as a whole. But does the
court nevertheless have jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim against
the diverse California defendant? If no, then the court must dismiss
the entire case. If yes, then the court could dismiss the nondiverse
claim and proceed with the diverse claim.
This is not an idle question. Diversity actions make up more than
a third of the federal docket, and multiparty and multiclaim diversity
11
suits are common. Yet many of these cases in fact lack complete
12
diversity. Because a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised
at any time and formally nullifies any progress that the parties have
achieved, the economic downsides of diversity contamination for
13
diverse litigants are considerable.
We propose that the answer to this question requires
consideration of two primary, and seemingly irreconcilable,
conceptions of subject-matter jurisdiction. The first—what we refer to
as “joint jurisdiction”—holds that the presence of the jurisdictional
spoiler contaminates other claims in the action, such that the federal
court lacks diversity jurisdiction over the diverse claim as well. In
other words, the claims must stand or fall together as one action.
The second theory—what we refer to as “several jurisdiction”—
holds that the court lacks jurisdiction over the nondiverse claim but
has always had, and continues to have, jurisdiction over the diverse
claim. In other words, the jurisdictional status of the claims is
determined severally, on a claim-by-claim basis.
Which of these jurisdictional conceptions is correct? Supreme
Court opinions dating as far back as 1824 seem to support joint
14
jurisdiction in the context of the complete-diversity requirement.
Yet a separate and equally longstanding tradition considers that same
requirement on a claim-by-claim basis, suggesting that spoiling claims
11. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014 Tables, U.S. District Courts—Civil, tbls. C
to C-5, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseloadstatistics-2014-tables [http://perma.cc/6254-SNBN] (last updated Mar. 31, 2014).
12. See, e.g., United Republic Ins. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 315 F.3d 168, 170 (2d Cir.
2003) (“We have previously expressed a concern that cases brought in federal courts in which
diversity of citizenship is not properly alleged and/or does not exist are far too common.”).
13. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006).
14. See infra Part I.A.
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may be individually dismissed to preserve jurisdiction over claims
15
between diverse parties. The doctrine, it turns out, is conflicted.
We engage this conflict and offer four contributions. First, in
Part I, we set out a descriptive account of joint and several diversity
jurisdiction and demonstrate that both theories boast doctrinal
support, making a binary choice between one or the other both
tenuous and inherently disruptive. Second, we offer in Part II an
analytical middle ground for resolving the competing traditions of
joint and several jurisdiction, namely, shifting the time of
jurisdictional assessment from the time of filing to a later point in the
litigation. Third, in Part III, we consider new concerns that this
middle approach generates, especially the problematic authority of a
federal court to render binding decisions in an action over which it
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Lastly, we explain in Part IV how
those concerns can be mitigated by other jurisdictional
authorizations, including the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction
doctrine and the jurisdictional-resequencing doctrine. By unpacking
the problems of this understudied feature of diversity jurisdiction, we
hope to bring closer attention to the fundamental but oft-overlooked
complexities of diversity jurisdiction as a whole.
I. COMPETING THEORIES OF COMPLETE DIVERSITY
As an abstract principle, the complete-diversity rule is
straightforward enough: every plaintiff in the action must be diverse
in citizenship from every defendant. But determining the precise
effect that a violation of the rule has upon a court’s jurisdiction in a
particular case can be a complicated exercise. The primary cause of
this complexity is the existence of two competing notions of subjectmatter jurisdiction, which we designate as “joint jurisdiction” and
“several jurisdiction.” Either of these might inform a court’s
assessment of its jurisdiction upon discovering a failure of complete
diversity.
Joint jurisdiction insists that a federal court treat the various
claims asserted in a diversity action as an indivisible action rather
than a set of separate and distinct units. Joint jurisdiction is thus
fittingly regarded as an all-or-nothing approach: either the court has
jurisdiction over all claims in the action or none of them. When
applying joint jurisdiction to address a violation of the complete-

15. See infra Part I.B.
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diversity requirement, a court would not consider that its jurisdiction
over claims between diverse parties would have attached at the outset
of the action had the complaint simply omitted the nondiverse
parties. The mere presence of a claim between nondiverse parties
would oblige the court to dismiss the entire action, including any
claims between diverse parties.
In contrast, several jurisdiction allows a federal court to engage
in a claim-specific analysis in connection with a putative diversity
16
action. By regarding the claims asserted in such an action severally,
that is, as separate and distinct units of a larger set, a court would
have jurisdiction over claims between diverse parties even though the
presence of a diversity spoiler would preclude complete diversity over
the action as a whole. Consequently, although incomplete diversity
would prevent the court from proceeding with the claims between
nondiverse parties, the court’s jurisdiction over claims between
diverse parties would endure, and the court could proceed with them
17
after dismissing the jurisdictional spoilers.
In this Part, we offer detailed accounts of joint jurisdiction and
several jurisdiction and document how each theory has enjoyed
doctrinal support.
A. Joint Jurisdiction
The current statutory authorization for diversity jurisdiction—28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)—provides that district courts shall have original
18
jurisdiction of specified “civil actions.” Like its statutory forebear—
19
the Judiciary Act of 1789 —§ 1332(a) contemplates that something
more than an individual claim is the proper unit of measure for a

16. See John B. Oakley, Integrating Supplemental Jurisdiction and Diversity Jurisdiction: A
Progress Report on the Work of the American Law Institute, 74 IND. L.J. 25, 45 (1998) (asserting
that federal diversity jurisdiction “can be understood and honored—indeed, better understood
and more coherently and consistently honored—when viewed through the lens of the claimspecific model of original jurisdiction”).
17. Id. at 52 (contending that the complete-diversity rule “does require the dismissal of the
jurisdictional spoilers, even when the claims by or against the nondiverse parties are so related
to the claims involving diverse parties that they could be adjudicated were the statute to call
merely for minimal rather than complete diversity among all parties joined in the complaint”).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is
between . . . citizens of different States . . . .”).
19. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress vested the newly created circuit courts with
original diversity jurisdiction over specified “suits of a civil nature.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (emphasis added).
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federal court’s jurisdiction. As Professor Joan Steinman has written,
“[w]hen persons knowledgeable of federal civil procedure think of a
civil action, we normally conceive of the collection of claims and
21
defenses” rather than individual claims.
Almost from the beginning, the Supreme Court has interpreted
Congress’s grant of diversity jurisdiction as conferring joint
22
jurisdiction. In Strawbridge v. Curtiss, a pithy but momentous
opinion construing the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Court confronted an
action between multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants, where
23
both sides included citizens of Massachusetts. Affirming the federal
circuit court’s dismissal for lack of diversity jurisdiction, the Court
construed the Act as requiring that “each distinct interest should be
represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or may be
24
sued, in the federal courts.” “That is,” the Court expounded, “that
where the interest is joint, each of the persons concerned in that
interest must be competent to sue, or liable to be sued, in those
25
courts.” With Massachusetts citizens on both sides of the litigation, a
necessary condition for the exercise of diversity jurisdiction—that
each of the plaintiffs has the capacity to sue each of the defendants in
26
federal court—was absent.
Strawbridge recognized a statutory requirement of complete
diversity of citizenship, which Congress has not seen fit to supersede
27
for more than two hundred years. Notably, the Court chose dismissal

20. See Joan Steinman, Claims, Civil Actions, Congress & the Court: Limiting the
Reasoning of Cases Construing Poorly Drawn Statutes, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1593, 1608–09
(2008) (arguing that existing doctrine allows multiple claims to comprise a single “civil action”).
21. Id. at 1603–04.
22. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
23. Id. at 267.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1424
(7th ed. 2015) (questioning the interpretation of Strawbridge but acknowledging that “the
decision has consistently been interpreted more broadly . . . as requiring ‘complete’ diversity”);
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3605 (observing that, aside from three specific exceptions, “the
Strawbridge rule has been followed for more than two centuries”). Indeed, in 1989, Congress
passed the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, which reinforced the rule of complete diversity.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2012). It has been reported that John Marshall came to regret his
opinion in Strawbridge. See Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV.
1829, 1881 (2007); see also Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.)
497, 555 (1844) (“We remark too, that the cases of Strawbridge . . . and Deveaux have never
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of the entire action as the appropriate remedy for noncompliance
with that requirement, rather than insisting that the circuit court
exercise jurisdiction over the claims between any plaintiffs and
defendants who were diverse in citizenship. The parties were capable
of suing or being sued in federal court only if the complaint omitted
nondiverse parties. Although explicitly reserving judgment as to
whether the complete-diversity rule would govern “where several
parties represent several distinct interests, and some of those parties
28
are, and others are not, competent to sue, or liable to be sued,” the
Court was clear that all claims in the case before it were to be
dismissed. At least for joint claims, then, Strawbridge supports the
theory of joint jurisdiction.
A more recent endorsement of joint jurisdiction emerged in
29
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger. Owen involved a
wrongful-death action filed in federal court against Omaha Public
30
Power District (OPPD) by Geraldine Kroger. Because Kroger and
OPPD were citizens of Iowa and Nebraska, respectively, the district
court’s jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship under
31
§ 1332(a) at the outset of the action. However, after OPPD
impleaded Owen Equipment & Erection Co. as a third-party
32
defendant, Kroger amended her complaint to join Owen as an
33
additional direct defendant. Importantly, in its answer to the
amended complaint, Owen did not specifically deny Kroger’s
allegation that Owen was a Nebraska corporation that had its
34
principal place of business in Nebraska.
35
After the district court entered summary judgment for OPPD,
which concluded OPPD’s involvement as a party, the action
36
proceeded to trial solely as to Kroger’s claims against Owen. It was
only then that Owen revealed that its principal place of business was
in Iowa, thereby establishing that it shared Iowan citizenship with

been satisfactory to the bar, and that they were not, especially the last, entirely satisfactory to
the [C]ourt that made them.”).
28. Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267–68.
29. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
30. Id. at 367.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 367–68.
33. Id. at 368.
34. Id. at 368–69.
35. Id. at 368.
36. Id.
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Kroger. The district court nonetheless refused to dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction and proceeded to enter judgment for Kroger after
38
the jury returned a verdict in her favor. The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed that judgment on appeal, reasoning that
the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Kroger’s claims
39
against Owen was proper under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.
Reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the
40
district court lacked jurisdiction over Kroger’s claims against Owen.
The Court emphasized that § 1332(a) “and its predecessors have
41
consistently been held to require complete diversity of citizenship,”
meaning that “diversity jurisdiction does not exist unless each
42
defendant is a citizen of a different State from each plaintiff.”
Kroger could not, therefore, have joined Owen as an additional direct
defendant in her original complaint against OPPD because Iowa
43
citizens would have been on both sides of the litigation. The Court
then observed that this same arrangement is precisely what Kroger
44
had deployed in her amended complaint. Consequently, when she
filed that pleading, “[c]omplete diversity was destroyed just as surely
as if she had sued Owen initially” because “‘the matter in
45
controversy’ could not be ‘between . . . citizens of different states.’”

37. Id. at 369; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012) (providing that, for purposes of federal
diversity jurisdiction, “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State . . . by which
it has been incorporated and of the State . . . where it has its principal place of business”
(emphasis added)).
38. Owen, 437 U.S. at 369.
39. Id. at 369–70. The Eighth Circuit determined that ancillary jurisdiction was applicable
because Kroger’s claims against Owen arose from the same core of operative facts as her claims
against OPPD. Id. at 369. It further determined that, because Owen had concealed its Iowan
citizenship from Kroger until trial, the district court had properly exercised its discretion to
invoke ancillary jurisdiction. Id.
40. Id. at 377 n.21 (“Our holding is that the District Court lacked power to entertain
[Kroger’s] lawsuit against [Owen].”).
41. Id. at 373.
42. Id.; see id. at 373–74 (“Whatever may have been the original purposes of diversity-ofcitizenship jurisdiction, this subsequent history clearly demonstrates a congressional mandate
that diversity jurisdiction is not to be available when any plaintiff is a citizen of the same State as
any defendant.”).
43. Id. at 374.
44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012)).
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Steadfastly defending the requirement of complete diversity,
the Court reasoned that, if ancillary jurisdiction extended to the
claims at issue, plaintiffs could circumvent the complete-diversity rule
simply by “suing only those defendants who were of diverse
47
citizenship and waiting for them to implead nondiverse defendants.”
The Court was also concerned that, if ancillary jurisdiction were
extended to a plaintiff’s claim against a nondiverse party who had
been previously joined in the litigation as a third-party defendant,
there would be no legitimate basis to refuse to extend the doctrine to
the same plaintiff’s claim against that same nondiverse party if it were
48
joined in the original complaint. The Court insisted that such an
outcome would allow the complete-diversity rule to be “evaded
49
completely.”
Owen can be viewed as supportive of the theory of joint
jurisdiction. It is true that the Owen Court did not explicitly address
whether the filing of Kroger’s amended complaint affected the district
court’s jurisdiction over her claims against OPPD. Nor did the Court
explicitly address whether the district court’s jurisdiction over
Kroger’s claims against OPPD would have been established in the
first instance had her original complaint named Owen as an
additional direct defendant. However, throughout its discussion, the
Court consistently framed the complete-diversity rule as an all-ornothing requirement. Nothing in Owen endorses the power of a
district court to exercise jurisdiction over claims between diverse
parties in the absence of complete diversity.
Justice White’s dissenting opinion confirms this understanding of
Owen. Reacting to the Court’s endorsement of joint jurisdiction,
Justice White offered an alternative perspective of several
jurisdiction: “The complete-diversity requirement, of course, could be
viewed as meaning that in a diversity case, a federal district court may
adjudicate only those claims that are between parties of different
50
States.”
Almost thirty years after Owen, the Supreme Court revisited the
subject of joint jurisdiction in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
46. Id. at 377 (“Congress has established the basic rule that diversity jurisdiction exists
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 only when there is complete diversity of citizenship. The policy of the
statute calls for its strict construction.”).
47. Id. at 374.
48. Id. at 374–75.
49. Id. at 375.
50. Id. at 380 (White, J., dissenting).
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51

Services, Inc. Allapattah arose from two separate actions that were
52
filed in federal court and premised solely on diversity of citizenship.
Unlike in Strawbridge and Owen, however, neither action involved a
lack of complete diversity. Instead, the jurisdictional concern in each
action was that at least one plaintiff—but not all plaintiffs—satisfied
53
the amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1332(a). The claims of
the plaintiffs who did not meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement could not, therefore, fall within the district court’s
54
original diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a). The question before
the Supreme Court was whether the district court could nonetheless
55
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.
To resolve that question, the Court first had to determine the
56
meaning of a key phrase in the supplemental-jurisdiction statute.
Section 1367(a) of that statute provides,
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction
over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
57
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.

51. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
52. Id. at 550–51.
53. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . .”).
54. Under § 1332, each plaintiff must independently satisfy the amount-in-controversy
requirement. See Clark v. Paul Grey, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 589 (1939) (“[W]hen several plaintiffs
assert separate and distinct demands in a single suit, the amount involved in each separate
controversy must be of the requisite amount to be within the jurisdiction of the district court,
and . . . those amounts cannot be added together to satisfy jurisdictional requirements.”). This
principle applies equally to a putative class action in which the named plaintiffs satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement, but members of the class do not. See Zahn v. Int’l Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 219, 301 (1973) (“Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the
jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the case—one
plaintiff may not ride on another’s coattails.”). Of course, as Allapattah holds, the supplementaljurisdiction statute, enacted after Clark and Zahn, authorizes a district court to retain the
jurisdictionally insufficient claims that those cases previously required to be dismissed.
Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 566.
55. See Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 549 (stating the question as “whether a federal court in a
diversity action may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs whose claims
do not satisfy the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement, provided the claims are part of
the same case or controversy as the claims of plaintiffs who do allege a sufficient amount in
controversy”).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
57. Id. § 1367(a).
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Under this language, a threshold requirement for a district court’s
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a) is the presence
of a “civil action of which the district courts have original
58
jurisdiction.” The availability of supplemental jurisdiction in the
cases before the Court, therefore, rested upon the appropriate scope
of a “civil action” within the meaning of the statute. Does a “civil
action” necessarily encompass all of the claims asserted in the
complaint? Or can a “civil action” encompass only the jurisdictionally
sufficient claims, leaving the jurisdictionally insufficient claims
eligible for supplemental jurisdiction?
The Court’s resolution of this thorny statutory issue resulted in
the application of different theories of subject-matter jurisdiction to
the respective requirements of § 1332(a). For the amount-incontroversy requirement, the Court endorsed a claim-by-claim basis
in accordance with a theory of several jurisdiction. The purpose of the
amount-in-controversy requirement, the Court observed, is “to
ensure that a dispute is sufficiently important to warrant federal-court
59
attention.” Because the presence of one jurisdictionally sufficient
claim establishes that importance despite the presence of additional
60
jurisdictionally insufficient claims, the Court rejected the jointjurisdiction notion “that a district court lacks original jurisdiction over
a civil action unless the court has original jurisdiction over every
61
claim in the complaint.” A “civil action” within the meaning of
§ 1367(a) could thus encompass only the jurisdictionally sufficient
62
claims, allowing supplemental jurisdiction to attach to other claims
63
failing the amount-in-controversy requirement. The upshot is that,

58. Id.
59. Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 562.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 560.
62. Id. at 549 (“When the well-pleaded complaint contains at least one claim that satisfies
the amount-in-controversy requirement, [the court] has original jurisdiction over a ‘civil action’
within the meaning of § 1367(a), even if the civil action over which it has jurisdiction comprises
fewer claims than were included in the complaint.”).
63. Id. (“[W]here the other elements of jurisdiction are present and at least one named
plaintiff in the action satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement, § 1367 does authorize
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs in the same Article III case or
controversy . . . .”). Of course, the restrictions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) might prohibit the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims of certain plaintiffs who do not satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement, even when such supplemental jurisdiction would be
authorized under § 1367(a), but those kinds of plaintiffs were not at issue in Allapattah. See id.
at 560 (“Nothing in the text of § 1367(b) . . . withholds supplemental jurisdiction over the claims
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for the amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1332(a), the Court
took a claim-by-claim, several-jurisdiction approach.
In contrast to the several-jurisdiction approach to the amount-incontroversy requirement, the Court made clear that joint jurisdiction
was the proper mode of analysis for the complete-diversity
requirement: “A failure of complete diversity, unlike the failure of
some claims to meet the requisite amount in controversy,
64
contaminates every claim in the action.” The Court supported this
approach by observing that the purpose of the complete-diversity
requirement “is to provide a federal forum for important disputes
where state courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring, home65
state litigants.” Because “[t]he presence of parties from the same
66
State on both sides of a case dispels this concern,” a single
nondiverse claim “deprives the district court of original diversity
67
jurisdiction over the entire action.” The Court thus concluded that
an action involving a complete-diversity violation cannot constitute a
“civil action” that would allow for the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction under § 1367(a). As the Court stated, “[i]ncomplete
diversity destroys original jurisdiction with respect to all claims, so
68
there is nothing to which supplemental jurisdiction can adhere.”
Even the dissenting justices in Allapattah appear to have agreed
with the Court’s endorsement of joint jurisdiction as it relates to
complete-diversity violations. The dissenters took as a starting point
the Court’s joint-jurisdiction approach to complete diversity and
would have applied it equally to the amount-in-controversy
69
requirement.
of plaintiffs permissively joined under Rule 20 . . . or certified as class-action members pursuant
to Rule 23 . . . .”).
64. Id. at 564; see id. at 566 (“[T]he special nature and purpose of the diversity requirement
mean[s] that a single nondiverse party can contaminate every other claim in the lawsuit . . . .”);
id. at 556 (“[Since 1789], the diversity requirement in § 1332(a) required complete diversity;
absent complete diversity, the district court lacked original jurisdiction over all of the claims in
the action . . . .”).
65. Id. at 553–54.
66. Id. at 554; see id. at 562 (stating that “the presence of nondiverse parties on both sides
of a lawsuit eliminates the justification for providing a federal forum”); see also WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 9, § 3605 (stating that the “justification for granting federal diversity jurisdiction does
not apply to cases in which there are citizens from the same state on opposing sides of the
litigation”).
67. Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 553 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 584, 590 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[D]iversity must be ‘complete,’ i.e., all parties
on plaintiffs’ side must be diverse from all parties on defendants’ side. . . . In contrast to the
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Notably, the established practice regarding removal of actions
from state court to federal court tends to confirm the jointjurisdiction approach of complete diversity. Although Congress could
set a different standard for removal than for original jurisdiction,
Congress has opted to make removal authorization generally
derivative of original jurisdiction and thus incorporate the complete70
diversity rule. In light of that, the Supreme Court has consistently
restricted diversity removal to cases in which all plaintiffs are citizens
71
of states different from all defendants. In addition, the Court has
72
long interpreted the removal statute to prohibit partial removal.
Indeed, removal procedure throughout the nation’s history, with one
73
swiftly corrected exception, has been whole-case removal. Removal
therefore reflects the approach of joint jurisdiction for diversity
74
cases.
Court’s construction of § 1367 . . . the interpretation presented here does not sever [diversity
and the amount-in-controversy components].”); see also Steinman, supra note 20, at 1636
(interpreting the dissent to “believe that the fact patterns presented no civil actions within
original federal jurisdiction because the monetarily-insufficient claims of some plaintiffs
prevented there from being any action within the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts”).
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (“Any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction may be removed . . . .”); City of
Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) (“The propriety of removal thus depends
on whether the case originally could have been filed in federal court.”); Scott Dodson, In Search
of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 61 (2008) (observing that § 1441(a)
incorporates the complete-diversity rule). Exceptions do exist. See Dodson, supra, at 61–65.
71. See, e.g., Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205, 209 (1880).
72. Id. (“If the whole suit could not be removed, no part of it could be taken from the State
court.”); see also Laura J. Hines & Steven S. Gensler, Driving Misjoinder: The Improper Party
Problem in Removal Jurisdiction, 57 ALA. L. REV. 779, 788 (2006) (“[A] diverse defendant
joined with a diversity spoiler has no statutory vehicle to seek removal on the basis that he has a
‘diversity suit’ unfairly (and perhaps intentionally) trapped inside a larger non-removable
action.”).
73. In the Separable Controversy Act, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306 (1866), Congress experimented
with “allow[ing] a diverse defendant to remove his part of the case to federal court—despite the
presence of joined, nondiverse co-defendants—if the case against him was ‘separable’ from the
case against the other defendants,” Hines & Gensler, supra note 72, at 785–86, but the
experiment was such a failure of confusion and inefficiency, see Edward Hartnett, A New Trick
from an Old and Abused Dog: Section 1441(c) Lives and Now Permits the Remand of Federal
Question Cases, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1099, 1157 (1995), that Congress quickly restored wholecase removal, see Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. The removal statute does allow
partial remand for “separate and independent claim[s],” but that provision has never played
much of a role in diversity-jurisdiction removal, and, today, is expressly reserved for federalquestion removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
74. Whole-case removal seems grounded in solid policy considerations. See Steinman,
supra note 20, at 1645 (“The ability to remove individual claims would be a potent weapon in
the arsenal of defendants who sought to burden plaintiffs with the substantial costs and other
inconveniences of parallel litigation.”); id. (“[T]he number of occasions when res judicata or

DODSON AND PUCILLO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1338

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/15/2016 12:17 PM

[Vol. 65:1323

Thus, from Strawbridge to Owen to Allapattah, the Supreme
Court has maintained a longstanding endorsement of joint
jurisdiction with respect to the complete-diversity requirement.
B. Several Jurisdiction
In a separate line of precedent, however, the Court has
cultivated a tradition of applying the claim-specific approach of
several jurisdiction to complete-diversity violations.
75
As early as 1825, the Court recognized that diversity-destroying
parties could be dismissed to salvage complete diversity. Carneal v.
76
Banks arose out of an alleged breach of contract between Carneal
77
and Banks for an exchange of land. Banks brought suit in federal
circuit court, asserting that Carneal fraudulently misrepresented good
78
title to the land and its value. When Carneal subsequently died,
Banks sued Carneal’s heirs to have the contract rescinded and title to
the land restored as before the contract. Banks also sued the heirs of
Harvie, the previous owner of Banks’s land, to ensure that title to the
land remained with Banks. Carneal’s heirs were not citizens of
79
Virginia, but Banks and Harvie’s heirs were all citizens of Virginia.
Nevertheless, the court entered a decree for Banks upon a jury
80
verdict.
On appeal from the decree, Carneal’s heirs argued that the
incomplete diversity among Banks and Harvie’s heirs deprived the
81
circuit court of jurisdiction over the entire action. In rejecting that
contention, the Supreme Court stated that jurisdiction over a claim
collateral estoppel could bite a litigant could greatly multiply.”); id. at 1646 (“[T]hese
consequences would undermine the goals of efficiency, convenience, cost-savings, and
avoidance of both duplication and the creation of unnecessary and potentially complex issues.”).
Of course, whole-case removal has its share of downsides as well. See Hines & Gensler, supra
note 72, at 781–82.
75. The idea perhaps originates with Corporation of New Orleans v. Winter, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 91 (1816), in which two plaintiffs sought ejectment as joint heirs in a diversity action,
but one plaintiff was incapable of suing in diversity because he was a citizen of a U.S. territory
rather than a state. Id. at 91–92. The Court held jurisdiction was lacking over the entire action,
but only because the ejectment action was an indivisible joint claim. Id. at 95. In dicta, the Court
surmised that, had the plaintiffs elected to sue severally, the spoiling plaintiff could have been
dropped to preserve the remainder of the action. Id.
76. Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181 (1825).
77. Id. at 182.
78. Id. at 182–83.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 187.
81. Id. at 187–88.
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against a diverse party would be disrupted by the presence of a
82
nondiverse party only if the latter were indispensable to the suit.
Because Harvie’s heirs were not even proper parties, much less
83
indispensable parties, they “[could not] affect the jurisdiction of the
84
Court as between those parties who [were] properly before it.”
Four years later, the Court applied a similar claim-specific
85
approach in Conolly v. Taylor. There, foreign nationals and a
Pennsylvania citizen sued Kentucky defendants and an Ohio
86
defendant in a federal circuit court in Kentucky. The Judiciary Act
at that time extended alienage jurisdiction over a suit involving
87
aliens, and diversity jurisdiction over a “suit . . . between a citizen of
the State where the suit [was] brought, and a citizen of another
88
State.” Accordingly, the claims by the foreign nationals against the
U.S. defendants met the statutory requirements of alienage
jurisdiction, and the claim by the Pennsylvania plaintiff against the
Kentucky defendant met the statutory requirements of diversity
89
jurisdiction. However, the statute did not authorize the circuit court
to exercise diversity jurisdiction over the claim by the Pennsylvania
plaintiff against the Ohio defendant because neither was a Kentucky
90
citizen. Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed the Pennsylvania
plaintiff, proceeded with the rest of the case, and ultimately entered a
91
decree.
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the defendants’
argument that the initial presence of the Pennsylvania plaintiff
tainted the whole case such that dismissal of that party could not save

82. Id. at 188 (“If the validity of this [jurisdictional] objection, so far as respects Harvie’s
heirs, be unquestionable, it cannot affect the suit against Carneal’s heirs, unless it be
indispensable to bring Harvie’s heirs before the Court, in order to enable it to decree against
Carneal’s heirs.”).
83. Id. (“[Harvie’s heirs] are made defendants by Banks, under the idea that the title to the
land sold by him to Carneal was in them; but this is a mistake.”).
84. Id.
85. Conolly v. Taylor, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 556 (1829).
86. Id. at 556–57.
87. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78–79 (“[T]he circuit courts shall have
original cognizance . . . of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where . . . an
alien is a party . . . .”).
88. Id.
89. See id.; Conolly, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 564.
90. Conolly, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 564.
91. Id.
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92

the remaining claims. The Court acknowledged that the joinder of
the Pennsylvania plaintiff prevented the exercise of alienage
93
jurisdiction over the claims of the foreign plaintiffs. However, the
simple dismissal of the Pennsylvania plaintiff effectively removed the
defect and enabled the circuit court to proceed on the basis of
alienage jurisdiction: “Strike out [the Pennsylvania plaintiff’s] name
as a complainant, and the impediment is removed to the exercise of
that original jurisdiction which the court possessed, between the alien
94
plaintiffs and all the citizen defendants.”
95
In Horn v. Lockhart, another nineteenth-century decision,
Texas complainants sued both Texas and diverse defendants,
96
resulting in incomplete diversity. However, rather than dismiss the
entire suit—a disposition that joint jurisdiction would have
compelled—the federal circuit court considered the claims severally
97
and dismissed only the Texas defendants. The court then entered a
final decree regarding the remaining claims among the completely
98
diverse parties.
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the
failure of complete diversity at the time of filing deprived the circuit
99
court of jurisdiction over the entire proceeding. The Court
emphasized that, because the Texas defendants were not
indispensable parties, “their interests were not so interwoven and
bound up with those of the complainants, or other parties, that no
100
decree could be made without necessarily affecting them.”
Considering that the rights of the remaining parties were “adequately
101
and fully determined without prejudice,” the Court was satisfied
that the jurisdictional defect “was met and obviated by the dismissal
102
of the [nondiverse defendants].”
92. Id. at 564–65.
93. Id. at 565 (“The substantial parties plaintiffs . . . are aliens; and the court has original
jurisdiction between them and all the defendants. But they prevented the exercise of this
jurisdiction, by uniting with themselves a person between whom and one of the defendants the
court cannot take jurisdiction.”).
94. Id.
95. Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 570 (1873).
96. See id. at 573–74, 579.
97. Id. at 574.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 579.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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The preceding cases reveal the Supreme Court’s willingness to
apply several jurisdiction in order to allow for a defect in complete
diversity to be cured through dismissal of nondiverse parties prior to
103
judgment. Somewhat more remarkable is the longstanding practice
of courts exercising this same authority even after judgment, a
practice the Court reaffirmed in the 1989 case Newman-Green, Inc. v.
104
Alfonzo-Larrain.
Newman-Green involved a suit brought by an American
company against foreign citizens and a U.S. citizen domiciled
105
abroad. A U.S. party domiciled abroad is neither a foreign citizen
nor a citizen of any state, but rather a “stateless” American who
106
cannot be sued under § 1332. Accordingly, the court lacked
jurisdiction as long as the stateless defendant remained in the case.
The defect, however, went unnoticed, and the district court
proceeded to enter judgment against Newman-Green despite the
107
absence of diversity jurisdiction. Newman-Green appealed.
The Supreme Court held that a federal court of appeals may,
under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which allows
108
parties to be dropped “at any time” and “on just terms” ), dismiss a
jurisdictional spoiler in order to preserve a judgment entered in the
109
absence of complete diversity. The Court first concluded that Rule
21 authorized district courts, even after entry of judgment, to dismiss
110
parties who spoiled diversity. The Court then extended this
authority to federal appellate courts, which had exercised such

103. For hundreds of years, federal courts have followed this course and held that defects in
complete diversity can be cured through the dismissal of diversity spoilers. WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 9, § 3608 (“Courts frequently employ Rule 21 to preserve diversity jurisdiction by
dropping a nondiverse party if that party’s presence in the action is not required under Rule
19.”).
104. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989).
105. Id. at 828.
106. Id. at 828–29.
107. Id. at 828.
108. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just
terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.”).
109. Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 827 (“We decide today that a court of appeals may grant a
motion to dismiss a dispensable party whose presence spoils statutory diversity jurisdiction.”).
110. Id. at 832.
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111

authority in prior cases. The Court stated it would not “disturb that
112
deeply rooted understanding of appellate power.”
Newman-Green makes sense from a standpoint of several
113
jurisdiction. Because the theory of several jurisdiction holds that a
district court’s jurisdiction over a claim between diverse parties is
unaffected by a complete-diversity violation, the district court would
retain separate jurisdiction solely over that claim even though the
jurisdictional spoiler was still a party to the action at the time of
judgment.
By contrast, Newman-Green deviates from the theory of joint
114
jurisdiction. Under joint jurisdiction, the presence of a jurisdictional
spoiler would contaminate the diverse claim, depriving the court of
jurisdiction over all claims. Dismissal of the spoiler, therefore, could
not “preserve” jurisdiction over the claims between diverse parties
115
because no jurisdiction over those claims had ever existed.
Thus, in contrast to the joint-jurisdiction line of cases from
Strawbridge to Owen to Allapattah, the Supreme Court has
maintained an equally longstanding commitment to several
jurisdiction in cases like Carneal, Horn, and Newman-Green.
II. SOME UNAPPEALING PROPOSALS
The dissonance resulting from the Supreme Court’s endorsement
of both joint jurisdiction and several jurisdiction in conjunction with
the complete-diversity rule invites resolution. But because each
111. Id. at 833–36.
112. Id. at 836; cf. Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181, 188 (1825) (upholding
jurisdiction, postjudgment, over a completely diverse slice of a case that also involved
dispensable nondiverse spoilers).
113. See Oakley, supra note 16, at 49 (“Newman-Green makes eminent sense if § 1332 is
understood to vest the district court with original jurisdiction of all claims between diverse
parties, with the joinder of claims between nondiverse parties raising the distinct issues of the
scope of the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction over such claims and the necessity of their
joinder.”).
114. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 27, at 1460 (“[If Allapattah] is right that the absence of
complete diversity means that the entire action has been jurisdictionally contaminated from the
start, how does one justify the decisions in cases like Newman-Green . . . ?”). Perhaps it is
unsurprising that Allapattah (authored by Justice Kennedy, who dissented in Newman-Green)
cites Newman-Green only for mundane principles of the policy rationale for complete diversity.
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 554 (2005).
115. See Oakley, supra note 16, at 48–49 (“If indeed § 1332 confers no jurisdiction over any
claim unless all claims in an action qualify independently for federal jurisdiction, the effect of
the dismissal of the jurisdictional spoiler would be to confer retroactively and nonstatutorily the
power to adjudicate the previously adjudicated claims between the diverse parties.”).
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tradition boasts substantial doctrinal support, merely picking one
over the other proves unsatisfying.
One proposal is to stick with joint jurisdiction for complete
diversity and limit or reform conflicting traditions of several
jurisdiction. Professor Steinman, for example, has favored a
somewhat modified joint-jurisdiction approach to complete diversity,
116
though her real focus is on the supplemental-jurisdiction statute.
Under her approach, a “civil action” under § 1367(a) is that group of
all claims and defenses that the Rules and jurisdictional statutes allow
117
to be asserted together. In her view, joint jurisdiction is consistent
with the linguistic term of a “civil action” and the pedigree of
118
complete diversity.
But joint jurisdiction has significant downsides. First, it is
seemingly incompatible with the longstanding several-jurisdiction
119
precedent. This theory would limit Rule 21—which allows parties to
be dropped “at any time” and “on just terms”—to situations not
120
involving a lack of jurisdiction. Perhaps that is a fair gloss on Rule
21; after all, Rule 18 does not allow joinder in excess of jurisdictional
121
limits even though the rule itself is not so limited, and Rule 82
122
disavows the rules’ effects on jurisdiction. But if so, joint jurisdiction
would undermine a long tradition in the lower courts of curing
123
jurisdictional defects through Rule 21 and otherwise. Professor
116. Steinman, supra note 20, at 1606–07.
117. Id. Professor James Pfander adopts a slightly different formulation that focuses on the
distinction between claims in the complaint and claims by plaintiffs involving subsequently
joined parties. See James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The Case for a
Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 146 (1999) (“[T]he general thrust of section
1367(b), . . . sympathetically read, operates not as a constraint on what the plaintiff does in the
initial complaint but on what the plaintiff does later with respect to subsequently joined
parties.”).
118. Steinman, supra note 20, at 1607.
119. See Oakley, supra note 16, at 48 (arguing that action-based contamination is
incompatible with curative opinions like Newman-Green).
120. FED. R. CIV. P. 21. Joint jurisdiction would preclude Rule 21’s applicability to diversity
spoilers.
121. See FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a) (“A party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or thirdparty claim may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an
opposing party.”); 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 1588 (“Clearly the terms of Rule 18 are
not sufficient to extend the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to state claims . . . .”).
122. See FED. R. CIV. P. 82 (“These rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
district courts . . . .”).
123. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 836 (1989) (“[I]t is apparent
that the weight of authority favored the view that appellate courts possessed the authority to
grant motions to dismiss dispensable nondiverse parties.”).
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Steinman dismisses these cases as using “an economizing shortcut”
that “need not be viewed as inconsistent” with theories of joint
124
jurisdiction, but it is hard to see how that can be, and she offers no
further explanation for why they are not inconsistent.
Second, the use of joint jurisdiction for the complete-diversity
requirement is in some tension with the widespread and undisputed
use of several jurisdiction in connection with other jurisdictional
doctrines, such as federal-question jurisdiction and the amount-incontroversy requirement. One could explain that distinction through
resort to the bias rationale of protecting out-of-state litigants, as
Allapattah does. As we noted at the outset of this article, however,
125
that bias rationale has never been particularly compelling. Even
Professor Steinman recognizes the apparent incoherence of applying
joint jurisdiction to the complete-diversity requirement but not to
126
federal-question cases.
Third, as a practical matter, joint jurisdiction imposes costs by
undermining claims between diverse parties whose only flaw is their
joinder with a claim between nondiverse parties. With no avenue for
retaining jurisdiction over them, those claims will have to start anew,
with all efforts toward resolving them wiped clean. As the Court in
Newman-Green noted, such an approach of “requiring dismissal after
years of litigation would impose unnecessary and wasteful burdens on
127
the parties, judges, and other litigants waiting for judicial attention.”
A different proposal is to stick with several jurisdiction and
reform or reinterpret the joint-jurisdiction tradition. Professor John
Oakley has favored the several-jurisdiction approach to complete
128
diversity. Despite the “action-specific” phrasing of § 1332, he has
argued that “the claim rather than the civil action is the fundamental
129
unit of litigation for purposes of federal jurisdiction.” Professor
Oakley acknowledges that complete diversity is a “significant

124. Steinman, supra note 20, at 1617–18; see also id. at 1627 (“I nonetheless would permit
district courts to ‘save’ the claims that are supported by an independent basis of subject-matter
jurisdiction or that fall within supplemental jurisdiction by dismissing only the unqualified or
‘offending’ claims.”).
125. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
126. See Steinman, supra note 20, at 1602 (acknowledging that “this purported distinction
may not hold-up”).
127. Newman-Green Inc., 490 U.S. at 836.
128. Oakley, supra note 16, at 45–52.
129. Id. at 26.
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130

impediment” to his claim-specific proposal, but argues that the rule
131
is “misunderstood.” In his view, “the mandate of the rule of
complete diversity restricts the scope of the supplemental jurisdiction
of the district courts in diversity cases. Incomplete diversity does not
divest the district court of original jurisdiction over claims for which
132
supplemental jurisdiction is not required.”
We sympathize with Professor Oakley’s position and think he
may well be correct about the historical basis for claim-specific
jurisdiction. But, as he resignedly accepts, endorsing his view would
disrupt a venerable tradition (even if misunderstood) of joint
jurisdiction dating back at least to Strawbridge. Further, Congress has
consistently adhered to the complete-diversity tradition when
amending the diversity statute, and its failure to amend the statute to
mandate the application of several jurisdiction suggests that the
statute now should be read as incorporating Strawbridge (even if
misunderstood). Professor Oakley’s view, then, would also risk
undermining what may now be the proper interpretation of the
statute. We think the resulting disruption to Strawbridge is
intolerable.
In short, because longstanding doctrine supports both joint
jurisdiction and several jurisdiction, reconciliation merely by selecting
one runs up against the wall of precedent of the other.
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL-TIMING SOLUTION
Rather than pick one tradition at the expense of the other, we
offer a middle road that, with slight tweaking, largely preserves both
traditions. That middle road begins with a focus on when subjectmatter jurisdiction attaches. The usual rule—the so-called “time-offiling rule”—requires federal subject-matter jurisdiction to be
assessed at the time of filing (or removal). In other words, if complete
diversity exists at the time of filing, then the court has subject-matter
jurisdiction even if subsequent events cause diversity to be lacking
later in the case.

130. Id. at 26–27 (“If it were true that a district court has no jurisdiction over any claim in a
diversity case unless every claim in that case is between parties of fully diverse citizenship,
§ 1332 would indeed be an ‘action-specific’ grant of jurisdiction . . . .”).
131. Id. at 27. Professor Oakley also concedes that aggregation is inconsistent with a pure
claim model, but would reinterpret aggregation rules as a form of supplemental jurisdiction. Id.
at 47.
132. Id. at 49.

DODSON AND PUCILLO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1346

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/15/2016 12:17 PM

[Vol. 65:1323

But the time-of-filing rule neither is itself jurisdictional nor must
control every case. The time of jurisdictional assessment can be
shifted to a later stage of the litigation, such as the moment after the
dismissal of a nondiverse party. This approach allows for a shift from
the time of filing to the time of cure of the jurisdictional defect,
thereby transforming several jurisdiction into joint jurisdiction at a
different time.
This Part explains how expanding the timeframe of jurisdictional
assessment in this manner can alleviate the tensions between joint
and several jurisdiction. This approach allows joint jurisdiction to be
the prevailing theory of complete diversity, even in cases curing
diversity defects by dismissing jurisdictional spoilers. Because
jurisdiction is tested only after a jurisdictional spoiler leaves the suit,
complete diversity would be present even under a theory of joint
jurisdiction.
A. The Usual Rule
Defects in subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised by any party
(or even by the court sua sponte) at any time (even for the first time
133
on appeal).
Once a court finds that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, it cannot proceed, for subject-matter jurisdiction is the
134
power of the court to act.
But these principles present a timing question: At what point in
time is subject-matter jurisdiction assessed? The traditional rule holds
that the citizenship of the parties is established at the time of federalcourt invocation, either at the time of filing in federal court or at the
135
time of removal to federal court. This time-of-filing rule has ancient
136
roots; in the 1824 case Mollan v. Torrance, the Court held that the

133. See Dodson, supra note 70, at 60.
134. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 384 (1884).
135. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3608 (“It has long been hornbook law . . . that whether
federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction exists is determined by examining the citizenship of
the parties at the time the action is commenced by filing the complaint with the court as
prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3.”); id. (“The majority of decisions typically
require complete diversity to exist at the time the removal petition is filed.”). A substantial
minority of courts require, for removal actions, that subject-matter jurisdiction exists both at the
time of removal and at the time of filing to prevent a party-citizenship change in state court
from creating diversity jurisdiction. Id. § 3723.
136. Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537 (1824).
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existence of diversity jurisdiction “depends upon the state of things at
137
the time of the action brought.”
As it happens, the time-of-filing rule often operates to preserve
diversity jurisdiction when it otherwise would appear lacking. A
quintessential application can be found in Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v.
138
K N Energy, Inc., in which the Court held that the diversity
jurisdiction acquired at the initiation of a suit cannot be divested on
139
account of a subsequent destruction of complete diversity. Freeport
arose from an action for breach of contract that McMoRan Oil & Gas
Co. and its parent company, Freeport-McMoRan Inc., filed in federal
140
court against K N Energy, Inc. At the time of filing, complete
diversity was present because McMoRan and Freeport (citizens of
Louisiana and Delaware) were diverse from K N (a citizen of Kansas
141
and Colorado). The district court’s jurisdiction was thus suitably
142
premised upon diversity of citizenship under § 1332(a).
McMoRan and Freeport later amended their complaint to add
FMP Operating Company, a Texas limited partnership to which
McMoRan had assigned its interest in the contract at issue, as a third
143
plaintiff. FMPO, however, was a citizen of Kansas and Colorado,
144
The matter nonetheless
making FMPO a nondiverse party.
proceeded to trial, after which the district court entered judgment for
145
the plaintiffs. On K N’s appeal from that judgment, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and directed that the action
146
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit reasoned
that the FMPO’s joinder destroyed complete diversity and thus
147
deprived the district court of jurisdiction over the entire action.
148
The Supreme Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s analysis.
Emphasizing “the well-established rule that diversity of citizenship is
137. Id. at 539; see also Morgan’s Heirs v. Morgan, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 290, 297 (1817) (“We
are all of opinion that the jurisdiction having once vested, was not devested by the change of
residence of either of the parties.”).
138. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426 (1991) (per curiam).
139. Id. at 427–28.
140. Id. at 427.
141. See McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. K N Energy, Inc., 907 F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1990).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1023–25.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1023.
146. Id. at 1025.
147. Id. at 1024–25.
148. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991) (per curiam).
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149

assessed at the time the action is filed,” the Court stated that “if
jurisdiction exists at the time an action is commenced, such
150
jurisdiction may not be divested by subsequent events,” including
151
the joinder of a nondiverse dispensable party. Concerned that “[a]
contrary rule could well have the effect of deterring normal business
transactions during the pendency of what might be lengthy
152
litigation,”
the Court held that “[d]iversity jurisdiction, once
established, is not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse party to
153
the action.” The teaching of Freeport is that the time-of-filing rule
allows a district court to ignore certain postfiling diversity-destroying
events by fixing the time of jurisdictional assessment at the time of
154
filing.
The time-of-filing rule protects against gamesmanship (fiddling
with parties postfiling to force dismissal) and waste (dismissal late in
the litigation) while promoting uniformity, clarity, and ease of
155
application. Thus, the usual rule is that a court must assess diversity
jurisdiction based on the lawsuit as filed, notwithstanding any
156
postfiling changes.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 428–29.
153. Id. at 428.
154. The rule applies in other contexts as well, such as postfiling citizenship changes and,
prior to 1998, the adding of nondiverse parties after removal. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob.
Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 575 (2004) (declining to allow diversity jurisdiction when a nondiverse
action became diverse through a postfiling change of citizenship of the nondiverse party); 14B
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3723 (noting that judicial practice prior to 1998 was that the
plaintiff should not oust federal jurisdiction in a removed case by adding a nondiverse
defendant). Congress occasionally has deviated from the time-of-filing rule. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(7) (2012) (providing that CAFA class-member citizenship may be determined after
filing if the pleading is not initially, but later becomes, subject to federal jurisdiction).
155. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3608; Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 580 (“The timeof-filing rule is what it is precisely because the facts determining jurisdiction are subject to
change, and because constant litigation in response to that change would be wasteful.”); Dery v.
Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 808 (2d Cir. 1959) (articulating the policy “that the sufficiency of
jurisdiction should be determined once and for all at the threshold and if found to be present
then should continue until final disposition of the action”).
156. See Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 571 (stating that time-of-filing rule “measures all
challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction premised upon diversity of citizenship against the state
of facts that existed at the time of filing”). The time-of-filing rule also applies to the amount-incontroversy requirement. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283, 293
(1938) (“[E]vents occurring subsequent to removal which reduce the amount recoverable,
whether beyond the plaintiff’s control or the result of his volition, do not oust the district court’s
jurisdiction once it has attached.”).
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B. Caterpillar
This time-of-filing rule is neither constitutionally mandated nor
157
itself jurisdictional but rather a manifestation of judicial policy. In
other words, unlike more rigid jurisdictional rules, the time-of-filing
rule is amenable to modifications and exceptions.
In the removal context, the time-of-removal rule is a matter of
158
statute. The removal statute states that a defendant can remove a
case of which the federal courts “have original jurisdiction” within
159
thirty days of the state case “becom[ing] removable.” Nevertheless,
the Court has held the time-of-removal rule to be exorable. In
160
Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, Kentuckian James David Lewis sued
diverse defendant Caterpillar and nondiverse defendant Whayne in
161
state court. Diverse party Liberty Mutual later intervened as a
162
plaintiff in order to assert claims of its own against both defendants.
163
Because Lewis and Whayne were both Kentucky citizens, there was
a lack of complete diversity in the initial complaint, and thus there

157. Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 571; 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3608. In removed
cases, the time-of-removal rule is statutory. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
158. In some circumstances, such as a change in a party’s citizenship, federal courts require,
as a matter of federal common law, complete diversity to exist at the time of filing as well as at
the time of removal. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3723. This Article focuses on the
statutory time-of-removal rule and its violations—for example, circumstances in which complete
diversity is lacking at the time of removal.
159. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1446(b)(3).
160. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996). Caterpillar builds upon Grubbs v. General
Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699 (1972), which confronted a case improperly removed to
federal court on the basis of the presence of the United States as a defendant even though the
United States was a spurious party. Grubbs, 405 U.S. at 701–02. After the United States was
dismissed, complete diversity remained in the case, and the district court entered judgment. Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that although U.S.-party removal was improper, the district
court had jurisdiction to enter judgment: “We have concluded that, whether or not the case was
properly removed, the District Court did have jurisdiction of the parties at the time it entered
judgment. Under such circumstances the validity of the removal procedure followed may not be
raised for the first time on appeal . . . .” Id. at 700. The primary difference between Grubbs and
Caterpillar is that, in Grubbs, the plaintiff failed to timely move to remand, while, in Caterpillar,
the plaintiff did timely move to remand. See id. at 701; Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 64. Nevertheless,
the Court in Caterpillar refused to vacate the judgment despite the plaintiff’s timely efforts.
Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 67. For more on Caterpillar, see Scott Dodson, A Revolution in
Jurisdiction, in THE LEGACY OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG 137, 147–48 (Scott Dodson ed. 2015).
161. Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 64–65.
162. Id. at 65.
163. Id.
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would have been a lack of diversity jurisdiction had Lewis filed in
164
federal court. The case as filed, therefore, was nonremovable.
However, Lewis and Whayne settled their claims in the state
165
court. Caterpillar then filed a notice of removal in federal district
court, asserting that Whayne’s dismissal made the case removable on
166
the basis of diversity of citizenship. Lewis timely moved to remand
the case back to state court, arguing that Liberty Mutual’s claim
against Whayne kept Whayne in the case and continued to prevent
167
168
complete diversity. Although Lewis was correct, the district court
169
erroneously denied his motion to remand, and the case thereafter
170
remained in federal court despite a lack of complete diversity.
Several years into the litigation, a settlement agreement reached
with Liberty Mutual resulted in Whayne’s actual dismissal as a party
171
to the action. The matter then proceeded to trial solely as to Lewis’s
172
claims against the diverse defendant Caterpillar. After the jury
returned a verdict for Caterpillar, the district court entered judgment,
173
and Lewis appealed. The Sixth Circuit reasoned—consistent with
the time-of-removal rule—that the absence of complete diversity at
174
the time of removal required remand for lack of jurisdiction.
Reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that a
failure of complete diversity at the time of removal “[was] not fatal to
the ensuing adjudication if federal jurisdictional requirements are met

164. A state-court defendant’s ability to remove an action usually hinges upon whether the
plaintiff could have filed originally in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (allowing
removal of “[a]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction”); City of Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163
(1997) (“The propriety of removal thus depends on whether the case originally could have been
filed in federal court.”). Accordingly, a defendant may remove a diversity action only when it
satisfies the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)—including the complete-diversity rule. See
Dodson, supra note 70, at 61 (observing that § 1441(a) incorporates the complete-diversity rule).
165. Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 65.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 70 (noting that “the Sixth Circuit correctly determined that the complete diversity
requirement was not satisfied at the time of removal”).
169. Id. at 65–66.
170. Id. at 66–67.
171. Id. at 66.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 64, 67.
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175

at the time judgment [was] entered.” In the underlying action,
complete diversity was restored once the jurisdictional spoiler,
176
Whayne, had been dismissed as a party prior to trial. With the
jurisdictional defect cured, the district court had diversity jurisdiction
over Lewis’s claims at the time that it entered judgment for
177
Caterpillar.
However, although the jurisdictional defect was cured by the
dismissal of the nondiverse party, the case was still improperly
178
removed in violation of the time-of-removal rule. Nevertheless, the
Court stated, “[o]nce a diversity case has been tried in federal
court, . . . considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become
179
overwhelming.” In other words, the statutory time-of-removal
requirement, even when properly invoked, can be overridden by
countervailing practical considerations.
C. Time Shifting and Its Implications
Caterpillar was a removal case under the removal statute’s timeof-removal provision. The time-of-filing rule for cases filed in federal
court is a judicial creation, and, as such, ought to be modifiable by
courts even more easily than the statutory time-of-removal rule at
180
issue in Caterpillar. Although the several-jurisdiction cases of
Carneal, Horn, and Newman-Green discussed above do not rely upon
manipulation of the time-of-filing rule to account for their holdings,
we think they should be understood in the same light as Caterpillar—
as cases allowing manipulation of the time-of-filing rule.
A subsequent case characterized Caterpillar’s “method of curing
a jurisdictional defect” to be “an exception to the time-of-filing

175. Id. at 64. The Court was explicit that “if, at the end of the day and case, a jurisdictional
defect remains uncured, the judgment must be vacated.” Id. at 76–77.
176. Id. at 73.
177. Id.
178. Id. (stating that although “[t]he jurisdictional defect was cured, . . . a statutory flaw—
Caterpillar’s failure to meet the [removal] requirement that the case be fit for federal
adjudication at the time the removal petition is filed—remained in the unerasable history of the
case”).
179. Id. at 75.
180. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 567 (2004) (acknowledging
that the time-of-filing rule is a judicial creation); id. at 594 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Grupo
Dataflux, it should be noted, refused to adopt a new exception to the rule for postfiling changes
in citizenship of a party. Id. at 582 (majority opinion) (“We decline to endorse a new exception
to a time-of-filing rule that has a pedigree of almost two centuries.”).
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rule.” We view Caterpillar, Carneal, Horn, and Newman-Green not
as “exceptions” to the rule but rather as judicial “shifts” of the time
for jurisdictional assessment (from the time the case first reaches
federal court to a time after dismissal of a jurisdictional spoiler). The
semantic difference is important. An exception offers no explanation
for resolving the tension between joint and several jurisdiction. A
time shift, however, allows joint jurisdiction to apply with consistent
force to a case “cured” of incomplete diversity by dismissal of the
jurisdictional spoiler.
The idea is to shift the time of jurisdictional assessment to after
dismissal of the nondiverse party. Evaluating complete diversity as of
that later time is consistent with joint jurisdiction. If, at that later
time, any nondiverse party has been dropped, then the case as a
whole—that is, joint jurisdiction—fulfills the complete-diversity
requirement as of that time. No jurisdictional spoiler remains to
contaminate the case. Shifting the timing rule, therefore, obviates
reliance on several jurisdiction, at least for the complete-diversity
requirement.
The upshot to all this is that Allapattah’s contamination theory of
182
diversity can be consistent with the cure cases of Carneal, Horn, and
Newman-Green. The key is determining when the court assesses
whether a contaminant exists. Shifting that determination away from
the time of filing means that a court, under the right circumstances,
can assess complete diversity as of the moment after the spoiler is
dismissed.
This view of the timing of jurisdictional assessment does require
some linguistic changes to precedent. Characterizing dismissal of a
nondiverse party as “preserving” diversity jurisdiction, as some
183
justices have written, resonates most strongly with notions of
several jurisdiction, as if the court always had jurisdiction of the
claims between diverse parties despite the presence of nondiverse

181. Id. at 572.
182. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 564 (2005) (“A failure of
complete diversity, unlike the failure of some claims to meet the requisite amount in
controversy, contaminates every claim in the action.”).
183. See, e.g., id. at 585 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The cure for improper joinder of a
nondiverse party is the same as the cure for improper joinder of a plaintiff who does not satisfy
the jurisdictional amount. In both cases, original jurisdiction can be preserved by dismissing the
nonqualifying party.”).
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parties. Joint jurisdiction, by contrast, maintains that there was
never any diversity jurisdiction to preserve in the case until the
moment the nondiverse party was dismissed. The term “cure” is
therefore more accurate, for it suggests diversity jurisdiction was
created by remedying a defect that, until then, prevented diversity
jurisdiction over any of the claims in the action.
We make no suggestions on how easy it should be for a court to
shift the time of jurisdictional assessment from the presumptive time
of filing to the time of a jurisdictional cure. In Grupo Dataflux v.
185
Atlas Global Group, L.P., the Justices were unanimous in deferring
186
to the rule’s good policy. And, in Caterpillar, the Court confronted
an unusual removed case that had been tried all the way to a verdict,
when “considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become
187
overwhelming.” Rule 21, if it applies to jurisdictional cures, sets the
188
arguably less restrictive standard of “just terms.” We do not resolve
this uncertainty here; instead, we merely make the claim that the time
of jurisdictional assessment can be shifted in a way that allows the
“cure” cases to be consistent with a joint-jurisdiction theory of
complete diversity.
IV. NEW TENSIONS
That the timing shift renders joint jurisdiction consistent with the
“cure” cases does not mean all is well and good. The idea that a court
in fact lacked subject-matter jurisdiction until a particular postfiling
time raises new concerns.
The primary concern is that the court presided over the case—at
least for a time—without diversity jurisdiction over any of the claims
in the action. During that time, the court may have issued interim
orders binding the parties or even a final judgment on the merits with
respect to one or more parties. Yet under joint jurisdiction, the court
never in fact had diversity jurisdiction to do those things. Rather, the
court obtained diversity jurisdiction for the first time only upon

184. Cf. Oakley, supra note 16, at 48 (“Newman-Green and its antecedents cannot be
squared with any action-specific conception of § 1332. The dismissal of a jurisdictional spoiler
‘preserves’ diversity jurisdiction over an already-litigated action to which a non-diverse party
had been joined.”).
185. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567 (2004).
186. See id. at 594 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
187. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 (1996).
188. FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
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dismissal of the diversity spoiler. As Justice Kennedy wrote in his
Newman-Green dissent, the “awesome power of curing actual defects
in jurisdiction” effectively “confers jurisdiction retroactively on the
189
district court.”
We question Justice Kennedy’s statement to the extent that his
use of the term “jurisdiction” encompasses all forms of jurisdiction.
Even when a court in fact lacks diversity jurisdiction during a failure
of complete diversity in a putative diversity action, other forms of
interim jurisdiction can supplement the lack of diversity jurisdiction
until incomplete diversity is cured.
Part of the problem in the discourse is that jurisdiction is framed
as a binary question: a court either has it or it doesn’t. But, in truth,
jurisdiction is more complicated. We delineate a few examples why
here. We do not mean to undertake a comprehensive dissertation—
we leave that for another paper. Rather, we identify these forms of
interim jurisdiction as vehicles for authorizing court adjudicatory
power during the pendency of incomplete diversity.
A. Defect Certainty
Once a court is aware of a true jurisdictional defect, then the
190
court cannot proceed until the jurisdictional defect has been cured.
Thus, it would be inappropriate for a court to recognize incomplete
diversity and yet continue to adjudicate the case on the expectation
that, later, a cure will occur. But there will still be case pendency and
court action (even if to issue an order dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction) during the time of incomplete diversity. Meanwhile, the
court has jurisdiction to issue interim orders under the jurisdiction-to191
determine-jurisdiction doctrine.
This doctrine recognizes a court’s power to issue rulings in order
192
to decide whether it has jurisdiction or not. The seminal case is

189. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 839–40 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
190. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884) (“The
first and fundamental question [in all matters] is that of jurisdiction.”).
191. For a seminal article on the topic, see Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing
the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491 (1967). For
an authoritative modern treatment, see KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE §§ 4.4, 5.1 (2d ed. 2009).
192. See RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1580 (4th ed. 1996) (“A federal court always has jurisdiction to
decide whether it has jurisdiction.”); Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270
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United States v. United Mine Workers, in which a district court
issued preliminary injunctions and, when those injunctions were
violated, sanctions for the violations. On appeal, the Supreme Court
found that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
the case. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the sanctions, explaining
that “[u]ntil its judgment declining jurisdiction should be announced,
[the district court] had authority from the necessity of the case to
make orders to preserve the existing conditions and the subject of the
194
petition.” This authority was confirmed despite the lack of statutory
subject-matter jurisdiction.
Thus, the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine can
support the authority of a court to issue certain orders during a
pendency of incomplete diversity in a state-law case. In the context of
incomplete but minimal diversity, the court can diligently and
expeditiously take steps to adjudicate the jurisdictional defect by
dismissing the spoiling claims, while simultaneously issuing orders to
maintain the status quo with respect to other parties. If a cure occurs,
then those interim orders will have been authorized under the
jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine. Orders issued after
the cure would then be authorized by traditional diversity jurisdiction.
B. Defect Error
If the court adjudicates a question of subject-matter
195
a remand
jurisdiction—such as on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion,
196
motion, or anytime through appeal—and erroneously determines
that jurisdiction exists, then the court effectively has de jure
jurisdiction until the jurisdictional ruling is reconsidered or
overturned.
At the point of challenge, a different jurisdictional doctrine kicks
in (see scenarios in Sections A and C) to cover the case until the court
U.S. 266, 274 (1926) (“Every court of general jurisdiction has power to determine whether the
conditions essential to its exercise exist.”).
193. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
194. Id. at 291 (quoting United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906)); cf. Kevin M.
Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisdictional
Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301 (2011) (discussing the doctrine of judicial
primacy, which requires federal courts to address jurisdiction before merits).
195. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (providing that a party may assert a defense of lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction by motion).
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012) (“A motion to remand the case on the basis of any
defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing
of the notice of removal . . . .”).
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adjudicates or avoids the challenge. But a number of doctrines can
prevent correction, thereby effectively leaving interim orders and
final judgments—even on the merits—in the absence of complete
diversity.
For example, the parties may forgo an appeal or a motion for
reconsideration, essentially preserving the court’s jurisdictional error.
Although party waiver, consent, and forfeiture cannot confer subject197
matter jurisdiction, the practical effect is that—barring sua sponte
reconsideration—the court’s orders will stand even in the absence of
jurisdiction.
Further, preclusion principles can prevent collateral attack of a
judgment—even a merits judgment—entered without jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has allowed judgments on the merits entered
without subject-matter jurisdiction to stand, even when jurisdiction
198
was never challenged. This rule of jurisdictional finality accepts the
fact that jurisdiction was lacking but renders that fact impotent to
undo what already has been done, even on the merits.
C. Defect Agnosticism
Rather than resolve a potential defect in subject-matter
jurisdiction (thereby also avoiding the scenarios in Subparts A and
B), the court can choose to remove the spoiling claims on
nonjurisdictional, nonmerits grounds. This is the doctrine of
199
jurisdictional resequencing.
In Sinochem International Co. v.
200
Malaysia International Shipping Corp., for example, the Court
allowed the dismissal of a case under the nonjurisdictional procedural

197. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3522:
[T]he parties cannot confer on a federal court jurisdiction that has not been vested in
that court by the Constitution and Congress. This means that the parties cannot waive
lack of subject matter jurisdiction by express consent, or by conduct, or even by
estoppel; the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is too fundamental a
concern to be left to the whims and tactical concerns of the litigants.
(footnotes omitted).
198. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115 (1963); Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171 (1938); McCormick v.
Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192, 199 (1825); see also Clermont, supra note 194, at 317
(“Because the essential issue of jurisdiction or notice was actually litigated and determined,
even if erroneously, the defendant cannot relitigate the same issue in subsequent litigation.”).
199. See Clermont, supra note 194, at 326; Heather Elliott, Jurisdictional Resequencing and
Restraint, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 725, 727 (2009); Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of
Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2001); Peter B.
Rutledge, Decisional Sequencing, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010).
200. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007).

DODSON AND PUCILLO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

JOINT AND SEVERAL JURISDICTION

3/15/2016 12:17 PM

1357

doctrine of forum non conveniens without first establishing—despite
201
openly questioning—the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. As
long as the potentially spoiling claim is dismissed on nonmerits
202
grounds, the court can continue with a case that then has complete
diversity.
Under this scenario, a court confronting an arguable defect in
complete diversity can, in an appropriate case, resequence the issue to
instead resolve the potentially spoiling claims on nonmerits grounds.
All orders rendered during that time will be authorized, for the
absence of diversity jurisdiction was never confirmed. Upon dismissal
of the potentially spoiling claims, the case attains complete diversity,
and the court can continue the case assured of diversity jurisdiction.
D. Defect Ignorance
If the court is ignorant of a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction,
and proceeds as if it possesses jurisdiction, then the court has
jurisdiction until jurisdiction is challenged. For example, perhaps the
parties’ pleadings allege and admit complete diversity even though
complete diversity in fact is actually lacking. For much of diversity
jurisdiction’s history, jurisdiction-in-fact determinations were
irrelevant because jurisdiction depended instead upon the
203
pleadings. Indeed, it was not uncommon for courts to enter
judgment on the merits even with the knowledge that jurisdiction in
204
fact was lacking. Even today, the pleadings play a large role in
jurisdictional determinations. The amount in controversy is
205
established by the good-faith allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint;
201. See id. at 432 (allowing dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine without first
establishing subject-matter jurisdiction); cf. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574,
583–88 (1999) (allowing dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction without first establishing
subject-matter jurisdiction).
202. See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 431 (“Jurisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to issue a
judgment on the merits.” (quoting Intec USA, LLC v. Engle, 467 F.3d 1041, 1041 (7th Cir.
2006))); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88–89 (1998); see also RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1412 (6th ed. 2009) (“If the
record fails to disclose a basis for federal jurisdiction, the court must suspend determination of
the merits of the controversy unless the failure can be cured.” (emphasis added)).
203. See Wood v. Mann, 30 F. Cas. 447, 449 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (Story, J.) (“[T]he question
was, whether the citizenship of the parties, as described in the record, gave the court
jurisdiction; not whether that citizenship as alleged was true in fact.”).
204. See Collins, supra note 27, at 1831–32.
205. Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961) (“The general federal rule has
long been to decide what the amount in controversy is from the complaint itself, unless it
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the actual amount in controversy is irrelevant unless the defendant
206
challenges the plaintiff’s allegation. The upshot is that the court is
deemed to have jurisdiction if the pleadings establish it until
jurisdiction is challenged. If jurisdiction goes unchallenged, then the
court proceeds with the case, and any order or judgment issued will
stand until overruled or reconsidered.
Of course, a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at
any time during the litigation, including for the first time on appeal,
and, if so, then a district or appellate court affirming the defect can
take appropriate measures under the scenarios in Sections A, B, or C.
E. Retroactive Jurisdiction for Final Judgments
The most troubling scenario is that in Newman-Green, in which
an appellate court simply dropped the jurisdictional spoiler to
preserve a judgment on the merits as to the diverse parties. Justice
Kennedy’s objection to retroactive jurisdiction seems strongest here,
207
as commentators suggest. The idea that a court can enter a final
judgment without complete diversity, and then confer diversity
jurisdiction retroactively, seems wholly at odds with the notion of
limited judicial power.
It may be that a combination of defect ignorance and the
jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine justifies the result in
208
Newman-Green. But even if not, the time-of-filing rule calls
Kennedy’s concern about incomplete-diversity final judgments into
question. Freeport is a prime example. There, complete diversity
appears or is in some way shown that the amount stated in the complaint is not claimed in good
faith.” (quotation marks omitted)).
206. See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 1008–09 (2006);
cf. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 552 (2014) (describing a similar
paradigm for establishing the amount in controversy in removed cases).
207. See Taylor Simpson-Wood, Has the Seductive Siren of Judicial Frugality Ceased to
Sing?: Dataflux and Its Family Tree, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 281, 285, 305 (2005):
[R]etroactive jurisdiction contravenes the jurisdictional precept that where a court
lacks the jurisdictional authority to entertain a case, any judgment entered by that
court is void.
....
. . . If a district court is without jurisdiction initially, there is no action in existence
to be considered. It follows, as night does day, that if there is no action, then there is
no binding judgment for the court to revive by retroactively conferring jurisdiction
upon itself.
(footnotes omitted); see also supra note 115.
208. Cf. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1217–45
(2001) (questioning the Court’s jurisdiction-first rhetoric and exploring expanded hypothetical
jurisdiction).
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existed at the time of filing, but a later-added nondiverse defendant
209
destroyed complete diversity. Nevertheless, the court proceeded to
210
trial and final judgment despite incomplete diversity. The Supreme
Court held that to be proper, stating that “[d]iversity jurisdiction,
once established, is not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse party
211
to the action.” Freeport thus allows a court to enter a final judgment
even in a case that in fact lacks complete diversity merely because the
time-of-filing rule fixes the assessment of diversity at an earlier time.
This strikes us as substantially undermining Kennedy’s concern about
a court entering a final judgment without complete diversity.
In the end, perhaps the outer boundary for when a court can
assess jurisdictional compliance belongs at final judgment, and
Newman-Green was wrongly decided. We mean not to resolve but to
observe. Suffice it to say that the applicability of joint jurisdiction and
time shifting does create new concerns regarding assumed
jurisdiction. But these new concerns do not mean that joint
jurisdiction is a failure; rather, they mean only that additional thought
is needed in these areas.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has created a conundrum for lower federal
courts confronted with violations of the requirement of complete
diversity in putative diversity actions. On one hand, the Court has
endorsed the application of joint jurisdiction, which would require
dismissal of an entire action—including those claims over which
diversity jurisdiction would have existed if only the nondiverse parties
had not been joined. On the other hand, the Court has endorsed the
application of several jurisdiction, under which dismissal would be
limited to claims between nondiverse parties; diversity jurisdiction
over claims between diverse parties would endure. In the end,
whether a claim survives a failure of complete diversity will come
down to a lower federal court’s fortuitous preference for one of these
traditions over the other.
Although each tradition boasts substantial doctrinal support,
neither the case-specific approach of joint jurisdiction nor the claimspecific approach of several jurisdiction offers an optimal method of

209. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 427 (1991) (per curiam).
210. Id. at 428.
211. Id.
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responding to a complete-diversity violation. The key to reconciling
these competing traditions, as we argue here, rests somewhere in the
middle. By shifting the time of jurisdictional assessment from the time
of filing to the time of cure of the jurisdictional defect, and invoking
other jurisdictional authorizations—such as the jurisdiction-todetermine-jurisdiction doctrine and the jurisdictional-resequencing
doctrine—a federal court can remain faithful to the established
tradition of joint jurisdiction while securing the finality, efficiency,
and other good outcomes that would be available under several
jurisdiction.

